Dynamics of overqualification : evidence from the early career of graduates by Erdsiek, Daniel
Dis cus si on Paper No. 17-020
Dynamics of Overqualification: Evidence 
from the Early Career of Graduates
Daniel Erdsiek
Dis cus si on Paper No. 17-020
Dynamics of Overqualification: Evidence 
from the Early Career of Graduates
Daniel Erdsiek
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp17020.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Dynamics of Overqualification: Evidence from the Early
Career of Graduates
Daniel Erdsiek∗
ZEW Mannheim
April 2017
Abstract
This study analyses the persistence and true state dependence of overqualification,
i.e. a mismatch between workers’ qualifications and their jobs’ educational requirements.
Employing individual-level panel data for Germany, I find that overqualification is highly
persistent among tertiary graduates over the first ten years of their career cycle. Accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity, results from dynamic random-effects probit models suggest
that only a small share of the observed persistence can be attributed to a true state
dependence effect. Unobserved factors are found to be the main driver of the high
persistence of overqualification. In particular, selection into initial overqualification at the
start of the career is of high importance. Furthermore, overqualification persistence is
shown to be partly attributable to observed heterogeneity in terms of ability and study
characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Labour markets of industrialised countries share the common feature that substantial shares
of workers are holding jobs which are not commensurate to their educational attainment.
Summarising previous studies, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) find that an average share of
30% of workers acquired a level of qualification exceeding the educational requirement of their
current job. Consequently, these workers are formally overqualified for their job, i.e. they
experience a vertical educational mismatch. This suboptimal allocation of workers across jobs
may signal an inefficient allocation of skills in the labour market because available skills are
not fully exploited. According to assignment theory allowing for skill-heterogeneity among
workers and jobs (Sattinger, 1993), workers holding jobs below their qualification level cannot
fully utilise their human capital and thus do not reach their individual production capacity.
At the economy level, misallocations in the form of overqualification may imply significant
productivity losses (McGowan and Andrews, 2015). Output losses may be particularly high
if productivity is highly contingent on the precision of job matches and if different types of
workers are poor substitutes (Gautier and Teulings, 2015). At the individual level, many studies
infer the costs of overqualification from its effect on wages which are assumed to represent the
marginal productivity of workers (Becker, 1964). Cross-sectional analyses consistently find that
overqualified workers earn more than their co-workers in the same low-requirement job but less
than equally educated individuals in adequate jobs (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Hartog, 2000).
Panel studies accounting for skill-heterogeneity among equally educated workers provide mixed
results. While some studies conclude that wage penalties only represent spurious correlations
because overqualified workers have lower ability (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011; Tsai, 2010),
other studies find that wage penalties diminish but remain significant after controlling for
skill-heterogeneity (Kleibrink, 2015; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009).
To what extent overqualification is detrimental at the economy or the individual level will
strongly depend on its longevity. If overqualification occurs just transitorily at the start of the
career before workers find suitable jobs, losses may only arise in the short-run until available
skills are optimally allocated. In contrast, if workers are permanently overqualified, long-term
losses may arise because of a continuous underutilisation of their human capital. In this case,
private and public educational investments into skills which are permanently untapped, i.e.
unproductive, may be partly wasted because of reduced returns in terms of wages or tax
revenues. This is of particular relevance in the context of the publicly subsidised expansion of
tertiary education induced by a strong increase in the demand for skills and the notion that
human capital promotes economic growth. Shifts in the relative demand for high-skilled labour
are considered to largely result from skill-biased technical change, i.e. changes in production
processes favouring the employment of high-skilled workers. Skill demand may rise due to
technical change embodied in capital goods, such as information and communication technologies
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(Michaels et al., 2014), or due to disembodied forms of technical change, such as organisational
change (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001).1 In order to meet the rising demand for skills, it is
one of the main pillars of the European strategy for economic growth (EU2020) to ensure
a steady increase in the supply of tertiary graduates (European Commission, 2010). At the
aggregate level, overqualification of graduates may occur if the shift in supply is not balanced
by the shift in demand for high-skilled labour. However, even in the absence of aggregate
imbalances, overqualification at the individual level may arise as a consequence of worker and
job skill-heterogeneity in conjunction with asymmetric information and labour market frictions
inducing costly job search (Sattinger, 2012).
Predictions on the duration and, ultimately, the costs of overqualification at the individual
level differ across related theories. According to career mobility theory (Sicherman, 1991),
overqualification is only a short-term phenomenon and part of a human capital investment
strategy of new labour market entrants. Workers deliberately choose jobs below their own
level of education in order to acquire relevant on-the-job training and experience promoting
upward mobility and a fast career progression. In contrast, further theories focus on labour
market frictions and suggest that overqualification will be highly persistent at the individual
level, e.g. because of segmented labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Scherer, 2004).
Descriptive findings based on panel data for graduates entering the labour market confirm
a high persistence of overqualification and show that previously overqualified graduates are
much more likely to be overqualified in the future (Verhaest and Velden, 2012). The observed
persistence may partly arise as a consequence of constant individual-specific characteristics
affecting the probability to be overqualified in every observation period, i.e. spurious state
dependence. For instance, individuals may permanently hold low-requirement jobs because
of an inferior level of human capital relative to equally educated individuals. In contrast, the
persistence could be partly attributed to a behavioural effect such that past overqualification
causally increases the probability of future overqualification, i.e. true state dependence. For
instance, true state dependence of overqualification may arise because workers get trapped
in a mismatch due to cognitive decline (De Grip et al., 2008), investments in specific human
capital (Pissarides, 1994), or reduced job search effort on-the-job (Holzer, 1987). In terms of
policy implications, it is crucial to detect whether overqualification arises due to differences
in individual characteristics or because of true state dependence. If overqualification causally
increases the probability of future overqualification, i.e. true state dependence is present, policy
measures that prevent entry into or promote exits out of overqualification can induce a lasting
reduction in the rate of overqualification. In contrast, if persistence arises solely due to constant
individual characteristics, policies facilitating exits out of overqualification have little impact on
future overqualification unless the factors causing overqualification are addressed directly.
1 Other potential sources for rising skill demand include international trade (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999) or
capital-skill complementarity (Krusell et al., 2000).
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The current study analyses the dynamic features of overqualification for the policy-relevant
group of tertiary graduates. The main aim is to disentangle true state dependence from
persistence arising due to differences in individual characteristics that are observed or unobserved.
Dynamic models of labour market state choice which account for unobserved individual-specific
effects face the problem of endogenous initial conditions. The “initial conditions problem” can
be considered as an endogenous selection problem because individual-specific unobserved factors
may affect both the persistence of a labour market state and the initial state in the first period
available in the data (Heckman, 1981b). True state dependence is likely to be overestimated if
potential endogeneity of the outcome in the first period is ignored (Chay and Hyslop, 2014).
Therefore, I employ the dynamic random-effects probit model proposed by Wooldridge (2005).
In order to integrate out the individual-specific effect, this estimator models the unobserved
heterogeneity as a function of the initial condition, individual-specific explanatory variables,
and a new random error that is uncorrelated with the initial condition.
The empirical analysis is based on panel data covering the first ten years of individual careers
for university graduates in Germany (HIS-Graduate Panel). Interviews were conducted 1, 5,
and 10 years after graduation and provide information on current overqualification and a rich
set of explanatory variables such as university and school grades, field of study, or previous
unemployment. Graduate overqualification is found to be considerably high over the observed
time span. While 53% of the graduates who were overqualified in the previous interview
remain overqualified in the next period, only 8% of previously well-matched graduates enter
overqualification. Therefore, the raw state dependence observed in the data, i.e. the difference in
the conditional probabilities to be overqualified, amounts to 45 percentage points. The dynamic
effect of previous overqualification reduces to 34 percentage points when a rich set of observed
characteristics is accounted for.
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, the results of the Wooldridge estimator suggest
that a moderate share of the observed persistence can be attributed to a true state dependence
effect. Previous overqualification experience is found to have a significant but small behavioural
effect on future overqualification amounting to 3 percentage points. Furthermore, the results
suggest that unobserved factors are the main driver of the high persistence of overqualification
over the early career of graduates. In particular, unobserved characteristics driving the selection
into the initial state of overqualification observed one year after graduation are strongly related
to the probability to remain overqualified later on. Relevant unobserved factors might include
preferences for particular job characteristics found in low-requirement jobs or labour market
frictions such as regional immobility (Büchel and Van Ham, 2003).
Sensitivity analyses show that the findings on true state dependence are robust to the choice
of the econometric model and the measure for educational mismatch. First, the estimations are
replicated employing the estimator proposed by Heckman (1981b). The Heckman estimator
differs from the Wooldridge estimator in the way how unobserved heterogeneity and the initial
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conditions are treated. Second, the baseline estimations are replicated using a measure for the
mismatch in the field of education instead of the level of education.
The study contributes to the scarce literature on true state dependence of overqualification.
A common feature of previous studies is that they rely on samples drawn from the entire working
population observed at different stages of individual career cycles. Consequently, as opposed
to the present study, they do not provide evidence for equally educated workers who enter
the labour market and are observed over the early career cycle. Focussing on a sample of
workers at the onset of their career is of particular relevance for testing theories hypothesising
that overqualification is a short-term phenomenon among new labour market entrants, e.g.
career mobility theory. The first available information on overqualification is observed much
more closely to the real start of the labour market experience in the present study than in
the few previous studies accounting for endogenous initial conditions. Furthermore, previous
studies focus on rather short-term transitions between consecutive years, while the present study
analyses dynamics of overqualification between observations approximately 5 years apart. This
eases a problem studies based on annual data often face, i.e. one single spell of overqualification
may span two consecutive years inducing spurious state dependence.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 introduces the data and provides
descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the econometric model employed to analyse the true
state dependence of overqualification. Section 5 provides the results and Section 6 provides the
sensitivity analyses. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Background Discussion
This section provides a review of the related literature. First, an overview on the theoretical
explanations for the existence and, in particular, the longevity of overqualification is provided.
Second, the results of previous empirical studies on the dynamics of overqualification are
summarised and discussed.
2.1 Theoretical Background
Several labour market theories suggest that overqualification is only a temporary phenomenon.
Human capital theory predicts that workers will always earn their marginal product because
production processes are continuously adapted to available input factors (Becker, 1964; Mincer,
1974). Therefore, underutilisation of human capital should not occur in the labour market and
overqualification will not exist in equilibrium. However, overqualification could temporarily arise
if the labour market is in disequilibrium because of a sudden increase in the supply of better
educated workers inducing a decline in their relative wages. In this situation, employers could
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hire more qualified, i.e. more productive, workers into positions previously held by individuals
with lower educational levels (Borghans and Grip, 2000). However, overqualification will
disappear once individuals respond to lower returns to education by reducing their investments
into education and firms adjust their production processes in order to make use of the higher
supply of skilled workers. According to human capital theory, prolonged overqualification can
only be explained as representing a statistical artifact arising from the fact that human capital
is observed only incompletely.
According to matching theory, the job match quality cannot be foreseen by workers and
firms because of imperfect information (Jovanovic, 1979). Because job match quality is an
“experience good”, workers might accept jobs that turn out to not match their skills. As a
consequence, mismatched workers will start to search for new positions and improve their job
matches until they find an appropriate position. In a similar vein, search theories stress the
costly and time-intensive nature of job search activities (Burdett, 1978). Workers might accept
a job offer below their educational level temporarily while pursuing their search on-the-job.
Therefore, overqualification is only transitory within these frameworks and will predominantly
occur at the beginning of the workers’ careers.
As suggested by the career mobility theory, overqualification might also be a part of a planned
career path (Sicherman and Galor, 1990; Sicherman, 1991). Workers might deliberately enter
jobs for which they are overqualified in order to acquire further skills through on-the-job training
which promote a rapid career development. From this point of view, overqualification at the start
of the career is short-lived and might serve as a stepping-stone to better jobs in the future within
or outside the firm. The career mobility theory provides explanations for both the employee’s
as well as the employer’s motivation for accepting a transitory phase of overqualification. In
addition to higher starting wages, potential returns to investments in high levels of education
include better prospects of promotion within firms or an upward move to other firms. Employees
maximizing their earnings over their career cycle might accept a lower pay at the start of their
contract in exchange for a favourable position in the firm’s promotion queue assuring higher
future earnings. In case promotions fail to appear as planned, workers will move to another firm.
From a firm perspective, employers might be willing to accept this agreement since they have
the opportunity to test whether the new workers are eligible for higher and more demanding
positions within the firm at lower costs during the overqualification period. According to the
theory, mismatches are resolved by either the employee or the employer in the long-run.
On the contrary, other theories focus on labour market frictions and suggest that overqualifi-
cation may be persistent at the individual level. In the job-competition model (Thurow, 1972),
an applicant’s place in the queue for a promising job is largely determined by his education.
Under imperfect information, employers use education as a proxy for future job performance
and trainability. From the employer’s perspective, a higher level of an applicant’s education
implies lower training costs. Based on the employer’s preference to hire those applicants who
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are likely to be the cheapest to train, overqualified candidates have a head start in the job
queue because they raise the highest expectations in terms of returns to further educational
investments. This model, thus, gives an explanation for the employer’s motivation for preferring
job candidates with schooling exceeding the job requirements. Concerning the supply-side, the
model does not directly explain the motivation of workers to accept a job offer below their
educational attainment since overqualified workers cannot realise a wage premium. The formal
qualification only determines the position in the job queue, but does not affect the wage offer.
However, the job-competition model suggests another potential supply-side explanation for
enduring overqualification. Individuals might acquire the highest level of education in order to
secure the best possible position in the job queue. If consequently the educational attainment
of workers increases, a reduction in the returns to schooling contributes to a crowding-out of
less qualified workers into low wage jobs or entirely out of the labour market. Since investments
are not reduced despite of lower returns to education in order to retain the position in the
job queue, a higher share of high-skilled individuals will end up in jobs below their skill level.
Furthermore, according to the model, most actual required skills are learned through experience
or on-the-job training. Therefore, workers in low-level occupations cannot compete for more
demanding positions suggesting that the state of overqualification is likely to be permanent.
The effect of geographic restrictions on the probability to be overqualified is emphasised
by the spatial mobility theory (Büchel and Van Ham, 2003). Due to costs of commuting and
migration, individuals are assumed to search for jobs in their local (regional) labour market.
Since the number of suitable jobs will be lower in smaller, regional labour markets than in the
global market, the probability of overqualification is assumed to depend on the spatial mobility
of job seekers. Empirical support for the spatial mobility theory is provided by the finding
that overqualification is less likely in larger and thicker local labour markets (Abel and Deitz,
2015; Büchel and Van Ham, 2003). As a consequence, overqualification caused by geographic
restrictions could persist as long as spatial flexibility of workers or job opportunities in a given
local labour market are not improved.
The assignment model is concerned with the problem of allocating individuals with different
skill levels to jobs with varying complexity (Sattinger, 1993). In practice, mismatches are
likely to occur because the distribution of workers and their skill levels will not fully match the
distribution of available jobs and their skill requirements. Furthermore, workers might accept a
job offer above their reservation wage before finding the optimal match because of imperfect
information. In the same vein, employers might hire an applicant before finding the optimal
one. Therefore, the phenomenon of overqualification will be an inevitable outcome of such a
complex allocation process. According to the assignment theory, the workers’ productivity does
not only depend on the individual human capital, but also on the match quality between the
individual characteristics and job tasks. Better skilled workers have a comparative advantage
in more complex jobs. Mismatches occur if workers are not assigned to a job type where their
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comparative advantages are best utilised. Consequently, high-skilled workers holding a job
with low skill requirements will not reach their individual productive capacity. The assignment
model therefore contradicts both the job-competition model suggesting that solely the job
characteristics determine productivity and the human capital model suggesting that solely the
worker’s skills predict productivity (Hartog, 1986). Concerning the longevity of overqualification,
models combining assignment with costly search have shown that job mismatch might be a
long-lasting phenomenon at the individual level (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Dolado et al.,
2009; Teulings and Gautier, 2004).
Hiring decisions of employers will be governed by productivity-based considerations. From a
firm perspective, hiring overqualified candidates might induce productivity losses due to lower
job satisfaction and motivation, or a higher incidence of shirking and absenteeism (Büchel, 2001).
Furthermore, a higher probability of frequent job changes could result in a loss of company-
specific human capital and induce transaction costs for finding new job candidates. Recent
studies employing firm-level panel data, however, find that firm productivity is positively affected
by the level of required education as well as by additional years of overeducation (Kampelmann
and Rycx, 2012; Mahy et al., 2015). Therefore, overqualified workers seem to be more productive
than their well-matched colleagues. This result is in line with the literature on wage effects of
overqualification finding significant returns to surplus years of education that, however, are lower
than the returns to required schooling. Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis
that overqualified workers earn more than their well-matched job colleagues because they are
more productive than the latter. Mahy et al. (2015) conclude that the significant positive effect
of overqualification on firm productivity seems to indicate that additional skills and capabilities
acquired in school outweigh potential effects of job dissatisfaction. Hiring applicants with higher
skills than necessary for the job could also be used as a form of insurance strategy in order
to ensure a continuous and uninterrupted supply of high-skilled labour to the firm (Cedefop,
2012; Desjardins and Rubenson, 2011). These findings suggest that employers might have an
incentive to hire and retain overqualified employees. This demand side effect might contribute
to the persistence of overqualification (Büchel, 2002).
As frequently discussed in the literature, overqualification may also arise due to individual
heterogeneity among workers who attained the same level of education (Hartog, 2000). If
the relevant individual-specific factors are persistent over time, they could lead to a high
degree of overqualification persistence. Since this does not imply a causal dependence between
previous and future overqualification experience, this mechanism is referred to as spurious state
dependence (Heckman, 1981a). In line with the human capital theory, individuals might be
overqualified because of low ability for their level of qualification. This situation then might
be consistent with a well-functioning labour market rather than indicating a form of market
failure. Since skill formation also depends on other factors than formal education, the measure
of overqualification might neglect other important components of the workers’ human capital
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required for demanding job tasks. In line with this human capital compensation hypothesis,
several studies have shown that individuals with an inferior level of ability and skills are more
likely to be overqualified (Büchel and Pollmann-Schult, 2004; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009).
Consequently, a share of the overqualified workers might just be “apparently mismatched” such
that observed overqualification does not come along with a significant underutilisation of skills
(Chevalier, 2003; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Green and Zhu, 2010). The fact that a transition
into a formally adequate job might not be an option for this group of workers might translate
into highly persistent overqualification and, thus, into spurious state dependence.
Another reason for enduring overqualification may be that workers voluntarily choose po-
sitions below their own level of education. They might have preferences for non-pecuniary
job characteristics available in low-requirement positions. For instance, these workers might
prefer an easier workload than they can find in jobs which they are adequately educated for.
Employing data on UK graduates, McGuinness and Sloane (2011) find that overqualified male
workers are more likely to value and to opt for jobs which offer a greater balance with family
life. This group is also found to place a lower emphasis on high earnings. This suggests the
occurrence of compensating wage effects, i.e. a lower wage for an overqualified worker could be
explained by better non-wage characteristics provided by the job (Sattinger, 2012). As long
as the workers’ preferences for low-requirement jobs remain unchanged over time, this could
induce another source for spurious state dependence of overqualification.
Alternatively, overqualification persistence could arise because of a causal effect of previous
overqualification experience implying true state dependence. Being overqualified in one period
may in itself increase the probability to be overqualified in the next period, even if compared to
another identical individual who was not overqualified in the base period. Several mechanisms
could explain such a state dependence effect of overqualification. Most of these mechanisms
have been discussed in the literature on state dependence in low wage and unemployment but
seem to be similarly relevant for overqualification which is often associated with wage penalties
and the underutilisation of skills.2 Overqualification may alter the process of human capital
acquisition and job-specific human capital investments may lock overqualified workers into
low-requirement positions (Pissarides, 1994). Workers’ productivity may also be negatively
affected by enduring overqualification for another reason. Knowledge and skills untapped during
longer periods of overqualification may depreciate or become devalued because of changing skill
requirements in jobs matching the educational level of workers (Heckman and Borjas, 1980).
De Grip et al. (2008) find a significant relationship between overqualification and cognitive
decline. Therefore, job mismatch may send negative signals to potential future employers who use
previous overqualification experience as a screening device for the applicants’ future productivity.
According to McCormick (1990), the signal may be even more negative for overqualification
2 In this related literature, scarring effects of low pay and unemployment are well-documented (Arulampalam
et al., 2000; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999).
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than for unemployment.3 In his model, unemployed high productive individuals will specialise
in job search for high-skilled jobs rather than take an interim low-requirement position, while
employers may use the individuals’ job search strategy as a productivity signal if individual
differences in productivity are unknown to them. Finally, overqualification spells may change
the individuals’ preferences or motivation to hold adequate jobs. Experiencing overqualification
may lead to a lower perception of the own market value discouraging workers to apply for more
adequate jobs in the future (Stewart and Swaffield, 1999). Overqualified workers may also be
locked in low-quality jobs because of a reduced job search effort on-the-job (Holzer, 1987) or
segmented labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).
2.2 Empirical Evidence
The longevity of mismatches is the focus of a growing strand of the empirical overqualification
literature. Several studies have tried to assess the validity of the career mobility hypothesis
stating that overqualification serves as a stepping-stone to better future jobs. In favour of
the career mobility theory, early studies using simple cross-sectional data sets often found
that experience and tenure are negatively correlated with the probability to be overqualified
(Alba-Ramirez, 1993; Sicherman, 1991). Following studies, however, have found no evidence for
a significant difference between promotion prospects of overqualified employees and adequately
educated employees in similar jobs (Büchel, 2001). Employing wage growth as a more direct
measure of upward mobility, Büchel and Mertens (2004) provide a test of the career mobility
theory for Germany. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, they find that overqualified
employees experience less wage growth than workers with the same level of qualification holding
adequate jobs. In a similar study for Sweden, Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) also find no evidence for
a higher wage growth among overqualified workers relative to well-matched workers in similar
low-requirement jobs.
In recent years, cohort studies of school leavers offer new empirical tests on the career mobility
at the time of labour market entry. Focusing on unemployed Flemish school leavers, Baert
et al. (2013) show that taking up a job below the educational attainment significantly delays
the transition into adequate employment. Based on a multi-national survey of college graduates
in 13 European countries and Japan, Verhaest and Velden (2012) analysed the persistence of
overqualification over the first five years of the career cycle. Among those graduates who were
overqualified in their initial employment in the year 2000 between 30% (the Netherlands) and
58% (Switzerland) have remained overqualified in the year 2005. In contrast, on average only 5%
of the graduates with a matching initial job have been found to be overqualified after five years.
3 Kroft et al. (2013) provide experimental evidence for negative duration dependence of unemployment in the
US. Sending fictitious job applications varying in past unemployment experience to real job postings, they
find that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of the
unemployment spell.
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Similarly, Frenette (2004) finds that a share of 74% of Canadian graduates who were overqualified
two years after graduation remained in that state three years later. Battu et al. (1999) make use
of survey data collected 1, 5, and 11 years after graduation for a sample of UK graduates who
completed their study programme in 1985. They find that approximately 30% of the graduates
never had a job that required a tertiary degree during the observed time span. Finding a
substantial rate of raw state dependence in the data sets employed, these studies suggest that
overqualification is a persistent phenomenon rather than a transitory state for a substantial
share of workers at the start of the career. However, these studies do not provide evidence
whether the observed persistence arises because of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, i.e.
spurious state dependence, or a genuine behavioural effect of previous overqualification, i.e. true
state dependence.
A few recent studies employ more advanced panel estimation models in order to evaluate
the size of true state dependence of overqualification by controlling for unobserved individual
heterogeneity. Employing annual German data from 2000 to 2008, Blázquez and Budría (2012)
find a very high persistence rate of overqualification. While 86% of previously overqualified
workers remain overqualified in the next year, only 2% of previously well-matched workers enter
overqualification. Therefore, the difference in the conditional probabilities to be overqualified,
i.e. the raw state dependence, amounts to 84 percentage points. Estimating a trivariate probit
model, the authors show that a share of 18% of this raw state dependence can be attributed
to a true state dependence effect. Employing the dynamic random-effects model proposed by
Wooldridge (2005), the study by Boll et al. (2016) also finds significant state dependence of
overqualification in the German labour market for the time period from 1984 to 2011. The
results are robust to the inclusion of two different measures for overqualification. Using the
same estimation approach, Kiersztyn (2013) provides evidence for overqualification being a
self-perpetuating state in Poland from 1988 to 2008. The risk of being overqualified is found
to be four times higher for those workers who have been overqualified in the preceding wave
relative to previously well-matched workers. Furthermore, Mavromaras and McGuinness (2012)
find that skill mismatch, i.e. a situation where workers report that their skills are not fully
utilised in their job, exhibits true state dependence in Australia.4
Only few studies have analysed which characteristics affect transitions into and out of
overqualification over the path of individual careers. Using a panel data set for American
workers, Clark et al. (2014) find that cognitive ability is a relevant factor for overqualification
dynamics. Higher scores in a cognitive ability test have a positive and significant effect on
the hazard rate out of overqualification. The authors also provide evidence for considerable
differences in the dynamics of overqualification with respect to race, gender, and unemployment
history. A higher rate of overqualification persistence is more prevalent among black workers and
4 The skill mismatch variable is constructed using the individuals’ responses to the following question: "To what
extent do you agree with the following statement: I use many of my skills and abilities in my current job"
(Mavromaras and McGuinness, 2012).
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female workers. Furthermore, longer duration of previous unemployment delays the transition
into a matching job. For Germany, Blázquez and Budría (2012) have shown that the probability
to remain mismatched is significantly affected by the workers’ personality traits. For instance,
high scores in the Big Five personality dimensions conscientiousness and extraversion decrease
the probability to remain overqualified.
A common feature of these studies on state dependence of overqualification is that their
results rely on samples of workers drawn from the entire working population observed at different
stages of individual career cycles. Consequently, they do not measure state dependence for
cohorts of equally educated workers who enter the labour market and are observed over the early
years of the career cycle. It is the main aim of the present study to contribute to the reviewed
literature by providing evidence on the extent of true state dependence of overqualification over
the early career cycle of university graduates in Germany.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on two cohorts of the HIS-Graduate Panel covering university
graduates who completed their study programme in 1997 and 2001, respectively.5 It is a
longitudinal nationwide study of tertiary graduates in Germany which surveys individuals
of each cohort 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years after graduation.6 This data set has several
advantageous features with respect to my analysis. In comparison to survey data covering the
entire working population, focusing the analysis on the policy-relevant group of graduates does
not produce small sample sizes. This is of particular relevance in the context of the study since
it focuses on the dynamics of overqualification which is a labour market outcome only a rather
small share of graduates will be affected by. Only a large sample size allows to adequately analyse
the subsequent labour market progression for the group of initially overqualified individuals.
In addition, the individuals are jointly observed over the first ten years of their career cycles
after entering the labour market as tertiary graduates and they face the same overall economic
situation. In order to further increase the comparability of graduates, I exclude individuals who
were older than 35 years at the time of graduation or who obtained the university entrance
certificate abroad. After deleting observations with missing values in the relevant variables,
the size of the remaining sample amounts to 5,987 graduates.7 In order to test for systematic
differences in sample attrition, I tested whether characteristics observed in the first interview
5 Hochschul-Informations-System (2007): HIS-Graduate Panel 1997. GESIS Data Archive, Köln. ZA4272,
dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.4272;
Hochschul-Informations-System (2010): HIS-Graduate Panel 2001. GESIS Data Archive, Köln. ZA5186,
doi:10.4232/1.5186
6 I thank the staff of the German Centre for Higher Education Research and Science Studies (DZHW) for the
opportunity to access the data from the third interview not included in the scientific use files.
7 According to the survey reports, the following number of interviews have been conducted in the respective
waves for cohort 1997 (2001): wave 1: 9,582 (8,103); wave 2: 6,220 (5,427); wave 3: 5,477 (4,734) (Fabian
and Briedis, 2009; Fabian et al., 2013). The reduction in sample size in the present study is mostly driven by
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significantly differ between individuals who dropped out of the survey and individuals who
participated in all three interviews. Unfortunately, I find that stayers have significantly better
grades than drop-outs so that a selection of more able graduates into the sample might be
present. In contrast, I find no significant difference in the hourly wage rate at the time of the
first interview between stayers and drop-outs. Since the incidence of overqualification at the
time of the first interview is slightly lower for stayers than for drop-outs, however, the results on
overqualification rates and persistence over the observed time span might be downward biased.
Potential biases caused by sample attrition are not accounted for in the present analysis.
3.1 Dependent Variable
The focal dependent variable in this analysis is graduate overqualification. Overqualification
indicates the occurrence of a vertical educational mismatch, such that workers hold a higher
qualification than is required by their job or position. Three different measures for overquali-
fication have been employed in the literature. They differ in the way how they evaluate the
level of qualification that is needed for a job and are based on either the respondents’ subjective
assessments, realized matches within occupational classifications, or job analysts’ ratings (see e.g.
Hartog, 2000, for an overview). The present study employs a subjective measure of overqualifi-
cation which is based on the respondents’ self-assessment of the level of educational attainment
required for their job. In particular, the graduates were asked whether they hold a position for
which a tertiary degree is a conventional requirement. Graduates are defined to be overqualified
if they indicate that their job usually does not require a tertiary degree. An indicator variable
takes the value 1 for overqualified graduates and 0, otherwise. The binary overqualification
status is observed at each of the three survey waves conducted 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years
after graduation for both cohorts.8 The subjective measure of overqualification has one main
advantage that is of particular relevance in the dynamic context of the study. As Hartog (2000)
and others pointed out, the subjective measure captures specific job characteristics that only
the job holder can assess and, thus, is not based on information aggregated at any occupational
level. Therefore, in contrast to the objective measures defined for occupational classifications, a
change in the overqualification status is possible within occupations because the tasks that have
to be performed by the respondent have changed. However, since this measure relies on the
workers’ self-assessment, it is sensitive to potential differences in the individuals’ perception of
job requirements. Therefore, I have to assume that the assessment of job requirements does
missing values in control variables. The raw dynamics of overqualification based on all available observations
do not significantly differ from those based on the estimation sample.
8 Only small fractions of 3%, 2%, and 1% of the graduates in the estimation sample have been unemployed at the
time of wave 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Respondents currently unemployed at the time of the survey were asked
to refer to their last job after graduation when they answer questions regarding their “current” job (including
the question on overqualification). As a robustness check, all estimations provided in this chapter have been
re-run excluding all currently unemployed respondents but the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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not systematically change over time at the individual level. Overall, the longitudinal cohort
study design allows to analyse the dynamic features of overqualification over the first ten years
of individual career cycles.
3.2 Explanatory Variables
Since this study focuses on the underlying mechanisms of overqualification persistence, it
is important to include relevant characteristics that may determine mismatches and could
contribute to spurious state dependence. Based on the vast empirical literature concerned with
potential determinants of overqualification, this study incorporates a rich set of explanatory
variables.
Individuals holding the same level of qualification may differ in (innate) ability and skills.
In line with the human capital compensation hypothesis, several studies have shown that
individuals with an inferior level of ability and skills are more likely to be overqualified (Büchel
and Pollmann-Schult, 2004; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009). Low-ability graduates lacking the
skills required for graduate jobs may contribute to a high persistence of overqualification because
of their high probability to stay in their formally inadequate position. In order to account for
differences in ability and skills among the graduates in the sample, this study incorporates school
leaving examination grades and university grades as proxy variables. Although grades are surely
an imperfect proxy for ability, previous research shows that cognitive as well as non-cognitive
skills are relevant predictors of grades (Almlund et al., 2011; Poropat, 2009). School leaving
examination grades may proxy primarily for differences in general skills and ability. Since the
procedures of the school leaving examination differ across the 16 federal states in Germany,
school grades are standardised within federal states. Concerning the differences in occupation
specific skills that are relevant for holding graduate jobs in a given field, especially university
grades may be a sound proxy variable. University grades are standardised within fields of study
and university types in order to account for substantial differences in the distribution of grades
along these dimensions.
Study characteristics, such as field of study or university type, are relevant determinants of
overqualification among graduates in several countries (Berlingieri and Erdsiek, 2012; Dolton and
Vignoles, 2000; Green and McIntosh, 2007). In Germany, individuals can choose between two
tracks of tertiary education. They can either enrol at traditional universities or at universities of
applied sciences. In general, traditional universities are academically more demanding than the
practically oriented study programmes at universities of applied sciences. A dummy variable is
generated taking the value 1 for graduates from universities of applied sciences and 0, otherwise.
The respondents’ fields of study are divided into four subject groups. The first subject group
consists of the three subjects Medicine, Law, and Teaching which require a state examination
as finals and can solely be studied at traditional universities. The remaining subjects can be
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studied at both university types and are divided into three groups, namely Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM subjects), Business & Economics, and Social & Cultural
Sciences. The individuals’ study duration is another potentially important study characteristic
that future employers may use as productivity-related signal. Since average durations of
programmes vary across subjects and university types, the individuals’ time needed for course
completion measured in semesters is standardised within subject groups and university types.
The family background of graduates may also affect the probability to find an adequate
job at the outset of the career cycle (Erdsiek, 2016). As a proxy for various forms of capital
transmitted within families, I include a dummy variable into the analysis indicating whether at
least one of the graduate’s parents obtained a tertiary degree. Social background may be related
to the individuals’ motivation or aspiration, may provide advantageous social networks for
finding promising jobs, or may ease the pressure to take a job offer due to financial constraints.
Concerning the role of gender for the occurrence of overqualification, previous results are
mixed (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). Most studies for Germany find a higher prevalence of
overqualification among women than men (Büchel, 2001). According to the theory of differential
overqualification (Frank, 1978), married women in smaller labour markets may have a higher
risk of overqualification because of the optimisation of dual job search for couples. Married
female workers may be tied movers or tied stayers since their job search is undertaken under the
condition that the job search of their husbands is optimised because they are often the primary
earners. For Germany, Büchel and Battu (2003) find that married women have a higher risk
of being overqualified, especially when they live in rural areas. In order to analyse whether
female graduates obtain a higher risk of overqualification over the early career cycle holding the
characteristics constant, a gender dummy is included in the estimation models. Furthermore, in
order to analyse whether the role of potential determinants as well as overqualification dynamics
differ according to gender, the estimations are performed for splitted samples.
So far, all presented explanatory variables are time-constant. In the main part of the analysis,
three time-variant explanatory variables are accounted for. Changes in job preferences and
family responsibilities over the observed time span may occur because of parenthood and marital
status, partly discussed in the context of the theory of differential overqualification above. On
the one hand, parenthood as well as getting married may increase the individuals’ reservation
wage which is a relevant factor for the decision to accept a job offer below the own qualification
level. On the other hand, increased family responsibilities may change the preferences for specific
job characteristics, such as working hours and overall workload, in a way that less demanding
jobs become a more favourable option.9 Changes in parenthood and marital status are observed
in each wave of the survey, i.e. 1, 5, and 10 years after graduation.
9 For instance, studies on the effects of maternity leave on subsequent labour market participation emphasise
that mothers may reassess their work preferences after first birth (e.g. Fitzenberger et al., 2016).
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In addition, unemployment experience is included as a time-variant explanatory variable.
Based on calender information provided by the respondents, the duration of previous unem-
ployment experience (in number of months) is calculated for each of the three waves. The
related literature on unemployment scarring commonly finds that past unemployment causally
increases the probability of future unemployment and also the probability to be low paid
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2008a; Stewart, 2007). Therefore, individuals exiting unemployment
are more likely to only find jobs with low skill requirements. In a similar vein, previously
unemployed university graduates may have problems to find an adequate job because of the
negative productivity-related signal for potential future employers. A further potential mech-
anism could be that prolonged unemployment decreases the reservation wage and graduates
are more likely to accept low-requirement job offers below their educational level (Stewart and
Swaffield, 1999). For Germany, Boll et al. (2016) find that previous unemployment increases the
risk of overqualification.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the relevant variables. One year after graduation (t=1), a
substantial share of 17% of the graduates is working in jobs that do not require a tertiary degree.
After four more years (t=5), the average share of overqualified graduates has slightly decreased
to 16%. Finally, ten years after graduation (t=10), the rate of graduate overqualification has
fallen to a share of 14%. At the aggregate level, job mismatch thus seems to occur throughout
the early career of graduates in Germany with a tendency to decrease with potential labour
market experience.
Turning to persistence at the individual level, Table A.1 in the Appendix depicts the frequency
of observed patterns of overqualification dynamics over the three time periods. The majority
of graduates (72%) was holding appropriate jobs at each t. In contrast, 6% of the graduates
have been permanently overqualified in every t. The columns 5 and 6 provide the distribution
of dynamic patterns conditional on the initial state of overqualification. 86% of initially well-
matched graduates remained in adequate employment 5 and 10 years after graduation. However,
among initially overqualified graduates only 41% were matched in both later periods and
approximately one third remained overqualified over the observed time span.
The transition matrices in Table A.2 provide the probabilities for entering and exiting
overqualification. Among graduates who were overqualified in t=1, a share of 50% has managed
to find a matching job five years after graduation, while the other half of this group remained
stuck in a mismatch (top panel). The probability to be overqualified in t=5 is considerably lower
for previously well-matched graduates. Only 10% of the graduates who found a matching job at
the outset of their professional career hold a formally inadequate job in t=5. Taken together,
the probability to be overqualified in t=5 is 40.4 percentage points higher for graduates already
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variable
Overqualification (t = 1) 0.17 0.37 0 1
Overqualification (t = 5) 0.16 0.37 0 1
Overqualification (t = 10) 0.14 0.35 0 1
Time-invariant controls
Female 0.50 0.50 0 1
University gradea 3.03 0.62 1.0 4.0
School gradea 2.83 0.63 1.0 4.0
Study durationb 11.17 2.56 6 20
University of applied sciences 0.28 0.45 0 1
Business Administration & Economics 0.16 0.36 0 1
Medicine, Law, & Teaching 0.23 0.42 0 1
STEM subjects 0.44 0.50 0 1
Social & Cultural science 0.18 0.38 0 1
Age at graduation 26.92 2.35 22 35
Parents high-skilled 0.51 0.50 0 1
Cohort: 1997 0.49 0.50 0 1
Time-variant controlsc
Married 0.41 0.50 0 1
Children 0.34 0.48 0 1
Months unemployed 1.73 3.77 0 53
Observations 5987
Note: t depicts the time of observation 1, 5, and 10 years after graduation; a The
German grading system is reversed, so that 1 is the lowest grade and 4 is the highest,
i.e. the best, grade; b Measured in semesters; c Overall statistics are presented. Source:
HIS-Graduate Panel 1997, 2001
overqualified in the previous period relative to previously well-matched graduates. Therefore,
overqualification exhibits a substantial rate of raw state dependence during the first five years of
graduates’ careers. The raw state dependence between t=5 and t=10 is even higher because the
probability to enter overqualification decreases while the risk of remaining mismatched increases
(bottom panel). If the transitions are pooled over the first 10 years of the career cycle, raw state
dependence amounts to 45 percentage points.
In Table A.3, the incidence of overqualification over the early career of graduates is provided
for relevant subgroups of the sample. In particular, the sample is stratified according to
gender, field of study, and quartiles of the university grade. The rate of overqualification is
higher among female graduates than among male graduates in each time period. For both
groups, the incidence of overqualification has reduced after 10 years of labour market experience.
Considerable differences according to the field of study show a clear pattern which endures
over the observed time span. The lowest rate of overqualification is observed for the fields
Medicine, Law, and Teaching (approx. 4%). The incidence of overqualification is considerably
higher among graduates of the STEM subjects (13%). However, overqualification is remarkably
more likely in the fields Business Administration & Economics (28%) and Social & Cultural
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Science (27%). A clear pattern also evolves regarding the distribution of overqualified graduates
across the quartiles of university grades.10 The incidence of overqualification gradually decreases
from the lowest to the top quartile. Graduates in the lowest quartile are more than twice as
likely to become overqualified than graduates in the top quartile. Again, while the rate of
overqualification decreases for each quartile over time, the pattern across quartiles remains
unchanged.
4 Methodology
The descriptive evidence presented in the previous section has shown that overqualification is
highly persistent at the individual level, however no conclusion on the underlying mechanisms
can be drawn from these results. The main aim of this study is to disentangle true state
dependence from persistence arising due to differences in individual characteristics that are
observed or unobserved. This section describes the econometric model and discusses related
issues concerning implementation and data structure.
4.1 Econometric Model
Using dynamic random-effects probit models, the importance of a behavioural effect from past
overqualification experience on future overqualification can be evaluated by controlling for
individual heterogeneity (observed and unobserved). The treatment of unobserved heterogeneity
and initial conditions is an important issue for the estimation of such models including the
lagged dependent variable. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity that exhibits persistence over
time will lead to an overstatement of the true state dependence of overqualification.
The econometric model can be summarised as follows. Let y∗it be the latent propensity for
individual i to be overqualified at time t. The latent propensity depends on the previous (realised)
overqualification experience yi,t−1, on observable explanatory variables summarised in the row
vector xit and on individual-specific attributes µi that are unobservable and time-invariant. An
individual is observed to be overqualified, i.e. yit = 1, if y∗it exceeds a constant threshold which
is assumed to be zero. The model is given by:11
y∗it = γ yi,t−1 + xit β + µi + εit i = 1, ..., N, t = 2, ..., T (1)
yit = I [ y∗it > 0 ] (2)
10Note that university grades are standardised within fields of study and university types in order to account for
substantial differences in the distribution of grades along these dimensions.
11Note that the model is presented in its standard notation indicating the lagged dependent variable as yi,t−1.
Due to the time structure of the data and following the notation used so far, the lagged dependent variable
will be indicated by yi,t−5 in the results section.
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where εit represents an idiosyncratic error term. It is assumed that εit|yi1, ..., yi,t−1, xi is i.i.d.
as N(0, 1) and that εit⊥(yi1, xi, µi) with xi = (xi2, ..., xiT ). In such a model, the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable, γ, is interpreted as measuring the “structural” or true state
dependence (Heckman, 1981a). “Spurious” state dependence due to permanent unobserved
heterogeneity is accounted for by the term for constant individual-specific attributes µi. In the
present study, this term may be interpreted to capture differences in the individuals’ unobserved
ability or preferences for specific job characteristics.
The estimation of this model requires to account for the initial conditions problem. It is
caused by the presence and correlation between the past value of the dependent variable and
the unobserved heterogeneity term in the equation. Treating the initial conditions as exogenous
would lead to an overstatement of the true state dependence effect if the initial conditions are
correlated with µi (Chay and Hyslop, 2014). In order to integrate out the individual-specific
effect, its relationship with the outcome in the initial period yi1 has to be specified. As suggested
by Wooldridge (2005), one possibility is to assume that yi1 is random and to specify the
distribution of µi conditional on yi1 and xi which leads to the joint density of (yi2, ..., yiT )|yi1, xi.
Following this estimation strategy, it is assumed that the individual-specific effect depends on
the initial condition and the strictly exogenous variables as follows:
µi = α0 + α1 yi1 + x¯iα2 + ai (3)
The inclusion of the time-averages of the observed explanatory variables x¯i = 1T−1
∑T
t=2 xit
accounts for potential correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the time-variant
explanatory variables as suggested by correlated random-effects models (Chamberlain, 1984;
Mundlak, 1978).12 In this type of random-effects models, it is possible to estimate the effect
of a change in xit by holding the time-averages fixed. It is assumed that the error term ai is
i.i.d. as N(0, σ2a) and that ai⊥(yi1, x¯i). Thus, the distribution of the individual heterogeneity is
specified as follows:
µi|(yi1, x¯i) ∼ N(α0 + α1 yi1 + x¯iα2, σ2a) (4)
Under these conditions, the probability to be overqualified is given by:
P (yit = 1|yi1, ..., yi,t−1, xi, ai) = Φ(γyi,t−1 + xitβ + α0 + α1 yi1 + x¯iα2 + ai) (5)
12The original Wooldridge model includes all values of the time-varying explanatory variables at each period
(except the initial period). Most studies rely on the within-means of the time-varying explanatory variables
instead. As shown by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013), this specification does not lead to biases. They find
that biases of the Wooldridge model in short panels documented by Akay (2012) are caused by including values
of the initial period into the computation of time-averages. In line with Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013), I
therefore use time-averages excluding the initial period. As a robustness check, the original Wooldridge model
including leads and lags is also estimated and presented.
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As shown by Wooldridge (2005), integrating out ai yields a likelihood function with the same
structure as in the standard random-effects model including the initial condition yi1 and the
time-averaged x¯i as additional explanatory variables in each time period t. Incorporating the
augmented set of explanatory variables, standard random-effects probit estimation methods can
be employed to estimate γ, β, α0, α1, α2 and σ2a.13
If γ is estimated to be significantly greater than zero, true state dependence is present
such that a previous experience of overqualification causally increases the probability to be
overqualified in the next period. Due to the non-linearity of the model, however, the size of the
state dependence effect cannot be gauged directly from the estimated coefficients. Therefore, the
average partial effect (APE) for the lagged dependent variable is calculated in order to evaluate
the extent of true state dependence. The fact that individual heterogeneity is unobserved is
problematic for the estimation of partial effects. One way to overcome this problem is to estimate
the APE under the assumption that the individual heterogeneity µi takes its average value.
E(µi) = α0 +α1E(yi1) +E(x¯i)α2 and can be consistently estimated by Ê(µi) = α̂0 + α̂1y¯1 + x¯α̂2
where y¯1 = ΣNi=1yi1 and x¯ = ΣNi=1x¯i. The APE for the binary lagged dependent variable (previous
overqualification) can be calculated as the discrete change in the probability to be overqualified
as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1:
ÂPE = Φ[γ̂ + xiβ̂ + α̂0 + α̂1y¯1 + x¯α̂2]− Φ[xiβ̂ + α̂0 + α̂1y¯1 + x¯α̂2] (6)
4.2 Implementation and Data Structure
While only scarcely employed in the overqualification literature, dynamic random-effects probit
models accounting for unobserved heterogeneity have been widely used in related studies
concerned with state dependence of low wage or unemployment (Arulampalam and Stewart,
2009). As compared to most of these studies, the structure of the data used in the present
analysis differs with respect to several aspects. Most studies on state dependence use more
than 3 waves of annual data for a sample of the entire working population at various stages of
individual career cycles. In contrast, my data set comprises 3 waves conducted approximately
5 years apart. Therefore, I observe changes in the individuals’ labour market status over the
medium-run rather than annual short-run transitions. Due to the longer duration between the
interviews, the advantage of covering the first ten years of individual career cycles comes at the
cost of observing the individuals at only three points in time. As opposed to this drawback,
the increased time lag between interviews eases a problem studies employing annual data will
often face. Spurious state dependence may occur if a single spell of the labour market outcome
investigated, e.g. unemployment, may span two consecutive years for a substantial share of
individuals. For instance, Arulampalam et al. (2000) take this problem into account and report
13For instance, the xtprobit command in Stata.
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that over one third of the unemployment spells in their annual data set lasted longer than one
year. As a further difference to most studies on state dependence, my data set solely comprises
university graduates such that differences in the level of educational attainment do not occur in
contrast to samples drawn from the entire working population. Therefore, I concentrate the
analysis on the policy-relevant group of tertiary graduates and only compare individuals that
are equally educated. Finally, the individuals are observed over the first ten years of their career
cycles after entering the labour market as university graduates. Therefore, the initial condition
is observed much more closely to the real start of the labour market experience than in most
previous studies. Nevertheless, accounting for the initial conditions problem remains important.
Even if the entire history of the process of overqualification experience is observed it would be a
strong assumption that unobserved ability or preferences are independent from the initial state
of overqualification (Wooldridge, 2005).
As already presented in the previous sections, the data set includes a rich set of explanatory
variables that may affect the risk of being overqualified. Some of these explanatory variables do
not vary over time at the individual level, such as the proxies for ability, the characteristics of the
study programme, or the family background. As suggested by Wooldridge (2005), time-constant
explanatory variables can be included in the dynamic random-effects model in order to increase
explanatory power. However, the model is not able to separately identify the partial effects
of the time-constant variables from their partial correlation with the unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
The time-variant regressors included in the model are assumed to be strictly exogenous,
conditional on the individual-specific unobserved effect µi. This generally rules out potential
feedback effects from changes in the outcome variable on future values of explanatory variables
(Wooldridge, 2000). Despite the fact that explanatory variables are often choice variables, studies
allowing for feedback effects by relaxing the strict exogeneity assumption are scarce. Focusing
on state dependence in poverty, Biewen (2009) allows for potential feedback effects from poverty
to future employment status and from poverty to future household composition. The author
concludes that in the context of poverty the assumption of strict exogeneity is violated for these
explanatory variables and that ignoring feedback effects may lead to biased estimates of the
state dependence effect. However, most studies concerned with state dependence in various
labour market outcomes assume strict exogeneity for all explanatory variables. For instance,
Arulampalam et al. (2000) and other studies focusing on state dependence of unemployment do
not account for the possibility that the time-variant regressors marital status and number of
children may depend in part on past unemployment experience. In comparison to the context
of the present study, feedback effects from unemployment on future explanatory variables may
be more likely and more severe than potential feedback effects from overqualification spells
in which individuals still are active in the labour market. Therefore, I assume that marital
status and parenthood are not affected by earlier overqualification experience. Furthermore, it is
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assumed that overqualification does not affect future unemployment experience. This assumption
may be violated if, conditional on the individual-specific unobserved effect, overqualification
experience reduces the individual’s chances to find any job, for instance due to negative signals
for employers.
5 Results
This section provides the results of the empirical analysis. As a starting point, the first
subsection provides the results from a simple dynamic pooled probit model taking only observed
heterogeneity into account. The second subsection provides the main results from the dynamic
random-effects probit model taking the selection into the initial condition and unobserved
heterogeneity into account.
5.1 Observed Heterogeneity
This subsection presents the results from a simple dynamic pooled probit model including
the lagged overqualification status as a determinant for future overqualification experience.
Here, it is assumed that the lagged overqualification status is exogenously given. A stepwise
inclusion of individual characteristics into the model allows us to gauge the relevance of observed
heterogeneity for the persistence from changes in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.
As shown in the first specification in Table 2, previous overqualification is strongly related
to future overqualification.14 Controlling only for cohort membership and gender, previously
overqualified graduates obtain a 44 percentage points higher probability to be overqualified in the
next period. This resembles the raw state dependence shown and discussed in the data section.
The average partial effect of the lagged dependent variable is moderately reduced by 2 percentage
points after including sociodemographic characteristics as well as previous unemployment spells
into the model. Parental background, age at graduation, and unemployment experience are
significantly related to overqualification. In contrast to most studies concerned with state
dependence of labour market outcomes, I am able to include further explanatory variables
concerning the study programme and individual ability. Accounting for differences across
university types and fields of study in specification 3, the effect of previous overqualification is
substantially reduced to 36 percentage points. Specification 4 additionally includes the proxy
variables for ability resulting in a further reduction of the dynamic effect. Taken together,
approximately one fifth of the average partial effect of previous overqualification can be explained
by observed heterogeneity because the state dependence effect is reduced by 10 percentage points
in specification 4 as compared to specification 1. Heterogeneity concerning study characteristics
14Since the lagged dependent variable is included, the estimates are based on overqualification status five years as
well as ten years after graduation as dependent variables. The standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
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Table 2: Results, Dynamic Pooled Probit
Dependent Variable: Overqualification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overqualification (t− 5) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.360∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.342∗∗∗ (0.013)
Female 0.014∗∗ (0.006) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.022∗∗∗ (0.006)
University grade -0.019∗∗∗ (0.003)
School grade -0.008∗∗ (0.003)
Study duration 0.007∗∗ (0.003)
U. applied sciences 0.022∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.020∗∗∗ (0.007)
BusAdmin/Econ ref. ref.
Med/Law/Teach -0.123∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.125∗∗∗ (0.007)
STEM subjects -0.057∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.058∗∗∗ (0.008)
Soc/Cult science -0.022∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.020∗∗ (0.008)
Age at grad. < 27 -0.030∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.025∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.012∗ (0.007)
Parents high-skilled -0.018∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006)
Married -0.005 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007)
Children 0.011 (0.007) 0.013∗ (0.007) 0.012∗ (0.007)
Months unemployed 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Log. Lik. -4116.3 -4068.7 -3933.4 -3897.2
Obs. Indiv. 5987 5987 5987 5987
Obs. Total 11974 11974 11974 11974
Note: Pooled Probit estimation; Average partial effects; Standard errors clustered at the individual level;
Previous period indicated by (t− 5); Significant at 1% ∗∗∗, significant at 5% ∗∗, significant at 10% ∗.
and individual ability seems to be particularly relevant.15 The question to what extent the
remaining dynamic effect of 34 percentage points can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity
or to true state dependence is analysed in the next subsection.
5.2 Main Results
This subsection provides the results from the dynamic random-effects probit model. Employing
this econometric model, selection into initial overqualification as well as individual heterogeneity
is taken into account in order to estimate the true state dependence effect. The results on the
extent of true state dependence of overqualification are presented in Table 3. For the complete
sample (specification 1), the average partial effect of the lagged overqualification experience
is significant and amounts to 3 percentage points. This implies that even after controlling
for observed and unobserved characteristics, graduates are on average 3 percentage points
more likely to be overqualified at time t if they have already experienced overqualification in
t−5.16 Therefore, I find evidence for a true state dependence effect of graduate overqualification.
However, the size of the causal effect of previous overqualification experience is substantially
smaller than the observed raw state dependence of 45 percentage points. It is also much smaller
15The results remain unchanged if random-effects models are estimated instead of pooled probit models or if the
sample is splitted for female and male graduates.
16Note again that t− 5 indicates the lagged dependent variable even though the actual time lag between the
first and second interview amounts to approximately 4 years.
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Table 3: Results, Wooldridge Dynamic RE Probit
Dependent Variable: Overqualification
All Female Male
(1) (2) (3)
Overqualification (t− 5) 0.029∗∗ (0.014) 0.031 (0.019) 0.028 (0.022)
Overqualification (t = 1) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.220∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.254∗∗∗ (0.038)
Female 0.019∗∗∗ (0.006)
University grade -0.019∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.023∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.015∗∗∗ (0.004)
School grade -0.008∗∗ (0.003) -0.014∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.003 (0.004)
Study duration 0.006∗∗ (0.003) 0.009∗∗ (0.005) 0.004 (0.004)
U. applied sciences 0.019∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.023∗∗ (0.011) 0.017∗ (0.009)
BusAdmin/Econ ref. ref. ref.
Med/Law/Teach -0.099∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.117∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.082∗∗∗ (0.008)
STEM subjects -0.055∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.057∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.053∗∗∗ (0.011)
Soc/Cult science -0.019∗∗ (0.008) -0.028∗∗ (0.012) -0.008 (0.013)
Age at grad. < 27 -0.010 (0.007) -0.005 (0.010) -0.016∗ (0.009)
Parents high-skilled -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.009) -0.005 (0.008)
Married -0.003 (0.010) -0.006 (0.014) 0.000 (0.014)
Children 0.007 (0.010) 0.018 (0.014) -0.003 (0.014)
Months unemployed 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Mean: Married -0.002 (0.013) -0.003 (0.018) -0.003 (0.018)
Mean: Children 0.009 (0.013) 0.013 (0.019) 0.008 (0.018)
Mean: Months unemployed 0.003∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗∗ (0.002) 0.002 (0.003)
σ 1.201 (0.101) 1.366 (0.150) 1.023 (0.138)
ρ 0.591 (0.041) 0.651 (0.050) 0.512 (0.067)
Log. Lik. -3827.1 -1920.5 -1894.3
Obs. Indiv. 5987 3009 2978
Obs. Total 11974 6018 5956
Note: Random-effects probit estimation; Average partial effects; Standard errors in parentheses; Previous
period indicated by (t− 5); Initial condition indicated by (t = 1); ρ: estimate of the cross-period correlation of
the composite error term ai + εit; Significant at 1% ∗∗∗, significant at 5% ∗∗, significant at 10% ∗.
than the average partial effect of lagged overqualification if only the observed heterogeneity is
accounted for (34 percentage points).17 The results thus suggest that most of the raw state
dependence is due to unobserved heterogeneity across graduates rather than due to a causal
dynamic impact. Therefore, unobserved factors seem to be the main driver of overqualification
persistence over the early career for graduates in Germany. The size of the true state dependence
effect is nearly the same for both female and male graduates, however, the effect loses its
significance in the gender-specific models presented in specification 2 and 3.
The effect of the initial condition, i.e. overqualification experience 1 year after graduation,
is highly significant and much larger than the effect for the lagged dependent variable in
all three specifications. This implies a substantial correlation between the graduates’ initial
overqualification status and the unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to comparable studies on
state dependence effects, initial conditions are actually observed at the beginning of individual
17See Table A.2 for the raw state dependence and Table 2 for the estimated state dependence effect if only
observed heterogeneity is accounted for.
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labour market careers in the current study. The results suggest that most of the observed
persistence of overqualification is attributable to the initial selection into inadequate job matches
based on unobserved factors.
The average partial effects for the observed explanatory variables show that female graduates
significantly obtain a 2 percentage points higher probability to be overqualified than their
male peers. Graduates with higher ability are less likely to be overqualified. This holds for
school grades that may proxy primarily for differences in general skills and ability as well as
for university grades that may proxy for occupation specific skills that are relevant for holding
graduate jobs in a given field. Graduates who needed a relatively long time to complete their
study programme, as measured by the standardised study duration in months, are significantly
more likely to be overqualified. Workers who graduated from a university of applied sciences are
more likely to be mismatched than graduates from traditional universities, even when differences
in the fields of study are accounted for. In comparison to graduates in Business Administration &
Economics, graduates in the other subjects are more likely to be adequately matched. In addition
to their time-specific values, the model includes the averages for the time-variant explanatory
variables. Only the time-averaged duration of unemployment experience is significant indicating
a correlation to the unobserved heterogeneity for female graduates.
To check the robustness of the estimated size of the true state dependence effect, Table A.4
provides further specifications of the dynamic model for the complete sample. First, specification
1 includes the lags and leads of the time-variant explanatory variables as proposed in the original
form of the Wooldridge estimator. The average partial effect of the lagged dependent variable,
however, remains unchanged. Second, unemployment experience is excluded from the model
since previous overqualification may exhibit potential feedback effects on future unemployment
spells leading to biased estimates (Biewen, 2009). Again the main results remain unchanged.
Third, the estimated effect of the lagged dependent variable only slightly increases if study
characteristics and ability are excluded and only basic sociodemographic controls are included
in the model. However, the significant negative effect of the initial overqualification experience
increases considerably illustrating the high relevance of study characteristics and ability for the
selection into early overqualification. Furthermore, the effect of parental education increases
and becomes significant signalling that these individual characteristics are relevant pathways for
family background effects on overqualification (Erdsiek, 2016).
6 Sensitivity Analyses
This section provides further robustness checks for the main results. First, the analysis is repli-
cated using an alternative econometrical model that differs in the way of modelling unobserved
heterogeneity and solving the initial conditions problem (Heckman, 1981b). Second, the analysis
is replicated employing another measure for job mismatch, i.e. horizontal mismatch.
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6.1 Heckman Model
For dynamic non-linear models with unobserved individual-specific effects, another approach for
handling the initial conditions problem has been proposed by Heckman (1981b).18 He suggested
to model the initial outcome of the dependent variable, yi1, jointly with the subsequent outcomes
of the dependent variable, yi2, ..., yiT . In order to integrate out the unobserved effect µi, he
suggested to approximate the unknown distribution of yi1|µi, xi. In the latent variable form, the
Heckman model can briefly be summarized as follows:
y∗i1 = zi λ+ θµi + εi1 i = 1, ..., N, t = 1 (7)
y∗it = γ yi,t−1 + xit β + µi + εit i = 1, ..., N, t = 2, ..., T (8)
where zi is a row vector of covariates including xi1 and additional exogenous instruments for
the initial condition. By construction, µi and εi1 are orthogonal to one another. It is assumed
that the initial observation yi1 is uncorrelated with εit and also that εi1 is uncorrelated with
the xit for all i and t. Moreover, it is assumed that both εi1 and µi are normally distributed,
the former with variance 1 and the latter with variance σ2µ. A test of exogeneity of the initial
condition in this model is provided by the test of θ = 0.
Equations (7) and (8) together specify a complete model for (y1, y2, ..., yT ). The contribution
to the likelihood function for individual i is given by
Li =
∫ {
Φ[(ziλ+ θµ)(2yi1 − 1)]
T∏
t=2
Φ[(γyi,t−1 + xitβ + µ)(2yit − 1)]
}
g(µ)dµ (9)
where g(µ) is the probability density function of the unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity
and Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. With µ taken to be
normally distributed, the integral in equation (9) can be evaluated using Gaussian–Hermite
quadrature (Butler and Moffitt, 1982).
In contrast to the Wooldridge model, the Heckman estimator requires additional instruments,
i.e. variables affecting the initial state but, conditional on this state, without an effect on
transition probabilities. Heckman (1981b) suggested that when modelling labour market
outcomes, initial conditions may be instrumented by using information prior to labour market
entry. Most commonly, information on the respondents’ family background have been used
as instruments in previous applications of the Heckman model for various labour market
18Several studies have compared the performance of the Wooldridge estimator and the Heckman estimator.
Based on monte-carlo simulations and an application for unemployment persistence, Arulampalam and Stewart
(2009) conclude that the results of both estimators are very similar and that neither of them outperforms the
other. In contrast, Akay (2012) concludes that in short panels (below 5 waves) the Heckman estimator should
be preferred because the Wooldridge estimator overestimates the true state dependence and underestimates
the persistence due to unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013)
attribute this conclusion to a misspecification of the Wooldridge estimator as it is used in the study by Akay.
They show that biases vanish if time-averages of the explanatory variables do not include the initial period.
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outcomes such as unemployment (Arulampalam et al., 2000), low wage (Stewart, 2007), or
social assistance receipt (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2008b). In particular, information on parental
occupation, employment, or education has been used. Focusing on overqualification in Germany,
Blázquez and Budría (2012) use information on the quality of the relationship with the parents
as instruments.19 Mavromaras and McGuinness (2012) also rely on parental employment as
instruments in their study on the state dependence of skill mismatch. Although employed by
numerous studies, one could argue that family background is not an ideal instrument. In the
context of overqualification, it could be assumed that the offspring from wealthy and highly
educated parents obtain a higher aspiration and motivation to escape from an initial mismatch
than workers with an adverse family background.20
In contrast to the previous studies, I aim to use a measure for the labour market condition at
the time of the first interview as an instrument for the initial overqualification status. Recently,
a line of literature has provided evidence for persistent wage penalties for workers who graduated
from university during a recession (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012). For Norway, Liu
et al. (2016) show that graduates are more likely to be affected by skill mismatch if they
entered the labour market in a bad economy. Furthermore, they find that initially mismatched
workers experience persistent negative effects on earnings and unemployment from graduating
in recessions. In contrast, workers who are adequately matched in bad times do not experience
significant wage penalties or higher unemployment than workers who are well-matched in the
same industry in good times. From that, Liu et al. (2016) conclude that cyclical mismatch might
be an important mechanism for the persistent negative effects associated with unfavourable
initial labour market conditions.
The authors employ the unemployment rate at the time of graduation as a measure for
initial labour market condition and argue that it captures exogenous labor demand shocks.
Since the present study relies on data from only two different graduate cohorts, variation in
the unemployment rate over time cannot be used as an instrument for initial conditions.21 As
an alternative approach, I construct field-specific unemployment rates at the time of the first
interview based on fine-grained information on the respondents’ field of study. This might
measure initial economic conditions affecting the probability to be overqualified, e.g. because
a higher field-specific unemployment rate might force more graduates in that particular field
to accept lower level jobs in order to avoid unemployment. Field-specific unemployment rates
are not readily available and have been constructed as follows: Based on administrative data
for Germany, the unemployment rates for tertiary graduates in 120 distinct occupations have
19In particular, Blázquez and Budría (2012) use information such as the frequency of arguments with the parents
when the individual was 14 years old. The authors employ a trivariate probit model in order to take the initial
condition problem into account, nevertheless the requirements concerning the instruments are the same as in
the Heckman model.
20For other analysed labour market outcomes, such as low wage or unemployment, one could assume the same.
21The aggregate unemployment rate for tertiary graduates was also very similar at the time of the first interview
for both cohorts, 3,1% in 1998 and 3,3% in 2002 (IAB, 2015).
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been computed.22 Merging this information to the original data set, the occupation-specific
unemployment rate at the time of the first interview is given for all respondents. In the next step,
the relevant labour market for each field of study is approximated by the pool of occupations
held by graduates from a given field. Finally, field-specific unemployment rates are constructed
by computing the unemployment rate among the entire pool of graduates in each field of the
available classification differentiating 51 fields of study.
Using the field-specific unemployment rate as an instrument for the initial overqualification
status in the Heckman model, the estimated coefficient was highly significant for the complete
sample and the female sample but turned out to be slightly insignificant for male graduates.
As an alternative, the occupation-specific unemployment rate has been used as an instrument
directly. The main results concerning overqualification state dependence did not differ between
both instruments. Therefore, Table 4 presents the results of the Heckman model including the
occupation-specific unemployment rate as an instrument for the initial condition.23
Since estimation coefficients instead of partial effects are presented, the size of the parameters
cannot be interpreted.24 The top panel of the table depicts the main panel estimation results
for time periods t=5,10, while the bottom panel depicts the results for the initial condition
equation (t=1). The occupation-specific unemployment rate at the time of the first interview
significantly increases the probability to be initially overqualified for both female and male
graduates. Therefore, on average the risk of overqualification is higher in occupations with
a lesser demand for graduates or excess supply of graduates even if some graduates select
another occupation than preferred because of a currently high unemployment rate in the
favourite occupation. The hypothesis of exogenous initial conditions is strongly rejected because
the respective test statistic θ is significantly greater than zero. Similarly to the Wooldridge
estimator, the coefficient on the lagged overqualification experience signals a significant true
state dependence effect if the initial condition is jointly modelled with the subsequent periods.
Furthermore, and in contrast to the Wooldridge estimator, the state dependence effect remains
significant for both samples of female and male graduates.
22Data source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB), SUF (Regional File 1975-2010).
Employer information coded at the 3-digit level of the German occupational classification KldB-1988 have been
aggregated to 120 occupational groups. See vom Berge et al. (2013) for further information about the data set.
23Descriptives on the occupation-specific unemployment rates are provided in Table A.5. From a theoretical
view, it might have been preferred to use field-specific rather than occupation-specific unemployment rates as
an instrument since the latter is prone to selection into occupations. However, the direction of selection is
not clear a priori since graduates might try to bypass overqualification by avoiding occupations with a high
unemployment rate. Furthermore, if similar to previous studies parental education is used as an instrument,
results do not qualitatively differ from the results presented here.
24In contrast to the Wooldridge estimator, the Heckman model cannot be estimated using standard
random-effects models and needs special software. For estimating the Heckman model, the redprob
command for Stata is used which was also used by Stewart (2007) and can be downloaded under
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mstewart/stata/. Since the command does not allow to
estimate partial effects for the initial condition equation, only coefficients are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4: Results, Heckman Dynamic RE Probit
Dependent Variable: Overqualification
All Female Male
(1) (2) (3)
Main Panel Estimation
Overqualification (t− 5) 0.333∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.386∗∗∗ (0.127) 0.303∗∗ (0.134)
Female 0.272∗∗∗ (0.065)
University grade -0.241∗∗∗ (0.034) -0.267∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.210∗∗∗ (0.045)
School grade -0.106∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.163∗∗∗ (0.051) -0.064 (0.042)
Study duration 0.101∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.133∗∗∗ (0.047) 0.078∗ (0.040)
U. applied sciences 0.256∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.257∗∗ (0.104) 0.253∗∗∗ (0.090)
BusAdmin/Econ ref. ref. ref.
Med/Law/Teaching -1.806∗∗∗ (0.151) -2.054∗∗∗ (0.228) -1.516∗∗∗ (0.208)
STEM subjects -0.739∗∗∗ (0.088) -0.817∗∗∗ (0.147) -0.670∗∗∗ (0.111)
Soc/Cult science -0.149∗ (0.087) -0.246∗ (0.128) -0.051 (0.128)
Age at grad. < 27 -0.140∗∗ (0.066) -0.090 (0.098) -0.191∗∗ (0.089)
Parents high-skilled -0.109∗ (0.060) -0.103 (0.088) -0.100 (0.079)
Married -0.034 (0.059) -0.050 (0.086) -0.016 (0.081)
Children 0.131∗∗ (0.061) 0.265∗∗∗ (0.089) 0.013 (0.083)
Months unemployed 0.037∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.041∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant -1.720∗∗∗ (0.115) -1.600∗∗∗ (0.172) -1.561∗∗∗ (0.144)
Initial Conditions Estimation
Female 0.240∗∗∗ (0.057)
University grade -0.180∗∗∗ (0.028) -0.137∗∗∗ (0.037) -0.237∗∗∗ (0.044)
School grade -0.089∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.082∗∗ (0.039) -0.098∗∗ (0.045)
Study duration 0.126∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.129∗∗∗ (0.042)
U. applied sciences 0.182∗∗∗ (0.061) 0.030 (0.083) 0.314∗∗∗ 0.094
BusAdmin/Econ ref. ref. ref.
Med/Law/Teaching -1.296∗∗∗ (0.102) -1.327∗∗∗ (0.127) -1.366∗∗∗ (0.189)
STEM subjects -0.717∗∗∗ (0.072) -0.801∗∗∗ (0.107) -0.700∗∗∗ (0.105)
Soc/Cult science -0.079 (0.082) -0.177∗ (0.105) -0.033 (0.140)
Age at grad. < 27 -0.067 (0.059) -0.023 (0.078) -0.113 (0.095)
Parents high-skilled -0.156∗∗∗ (0.054) -0.116∗ (0.070) -0.203∗∗ (0.085)
Married 0.105 (0.073) 0.094 (0.099) 0.136 (0.110)
Children 0.082 (0.093) 0.306∗∗ (0.128) -0.168 (0.143)
Months unemployed 0.039∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.043∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.035∗ (0.019)
Unemployment rate 0.110∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.133∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.025)
Constant -1.387∗∗∗ (0.102) -1.130∗∗∗ (0.137) -1.441∗∗∗ (0.152)
θ 0.583 (0.055) 0.459 (0.057) 0.787 (0.121)
ρ 0.622 (0.039) 0.668 (0.050) 0.562 (0.064)
Log. Lik. -6176.5 -3151.1 -3004.1
Obs. Indiv. 5987 3009 2978
Obs. Total 17961 9027 8934
Note: Random-effects probit estimation; Estimation coefficients are displayed; Standard errors in parentheses;
Stata command: redprob; ρ: estimate of the cross-period correlation of the composite error term µi + εit;
θ: statistic used to test whether the initial conditions are exogenous. The estimate of θ is significantly greater
than zero, i.e. the hypothesis that the initial conditions are exogenous is rejected; Significant at 1% ∗∗∗,
significant at 5% ∗∗, significant at 10% ∗.
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Table 5: Results, Predicted Probabilities of Overqualification
All Female Male
Raw Data Probabilities
P(yt = 1 | yt−5 = 0) 7.9 8.0 7.8
P(yt = 1 | yt−5 = 1) 52.6 55.2 49.5
Difference 44.7 47.2 41.7
Wooldridge Estimator
Predicted Probabilities
P(yt = 1 | yt−5 = 0) 8.4 9.0 8.0
P(yt = 1 | yt−5 = 1) 11.3 12.1 10.8
Difference 2.9 3.1 2.8
Heckman Estimator
Predicted Probabilities
P(yt = 1 | yt−5 = 0) 6.1 6.5 5.8
P(yt = 1 | yt−5 = 1) 10.0 11.1 9.5
Difference 3.9 4.6 3.7
Note: yt depicts the overqualification status in time period t; Proba-
bilities are predicted under the assumption that the individual hetero-
geneity takes its average value.
In order to assess the robustness of the estimated size of the true state dependence, Table 5
presents the average partial effect of the lagged dependent variable from the Heckman model and
the Wooldridge model as well as the raw state dependence observed in the data. The average
partial effects are obtained by subtracting the predicted probabilities of being overqualified
conditional on the previous overqualification status under the assumption that the individual-
specific heterogeneity takes its average value. The Heckman model estimate of the true state
dependence effect amounts to 4 percentage points which is only slightly higher than the
Wooldridge model estimate of 3 percentage points. In contrast to the Wooldridge estimator,
gender differences in the rate of true state dependence are more nuanced in the Heckman model.
Female graduates experience a slightly higher behavioural effect of past overqualification than
male graduates but the difference amounts to less than a percentage point. Overall, the result
that the true state dependence effect is much smaller than the raw state dependence of 45
percentage points is robust to the choice of econometrical models that differ in the treatment of
individual-specific heterogeneity and the initial conditions problem.
6.2 Horizontal Mismatch
As a robustness check on the finding that unobserved factors are the main driver of observed
persistence of job mismatch, this section replicates the estimation of the Wooldridge model
using another measure for educational mismatch as a dependent variable (Table 6). Instead of
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Table 6: Results, Wooldridge Dynamic RE Probit, Horizontal Mismatch
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Mismatch
All Female Male
(1) (2) (3)
Horizontal mismatch (t− 5) 0.039∗∗ (0.017) 0.044∗ (0.025) 0.033 (0.023)
Horizontal mismatch (t = 1) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.038)
Female 0.011∗ (0.006)
University grade -0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.009∗∗ (0.004)
School grade -0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.015∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.006 (0.004)
Study duration 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗ (0.005) 0.011∗∗ (0.004)
U. applied sciences -0.007 (0.007) -0.007 (0.011) -0.008 (0.009)
BusAdmin/Econ ref. ref. ref.
Med/Law/Teach -0.030∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.037∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.030∗∗ (0.012)
STEM subjects 0.027∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.018 (0.014) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.011)
Soc/Cult science 0.035∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.019 (0.015) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.022)
Age at grad. < 27 -0.009 (0.007) -0.012 (0.010) -0.006 (0.009)
Parents high-skilled -0.009 (0.006) -0.003 (0.009) -0.015∗ (0.008)
Married 0.003 (0.010) -0.000 (0.016) 0.006 (0.013)
Children 0.013 (0.011) 0.010 (0.016) 0.014 (0.014)
Months unemployed 0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002)
Mean: Married -0.008 (0.013) -0.010 (0.019) -0.006 (0.018)
Mean: Children -0.010 (0.013) 0.002 (0.020) -0.021 (0.018)
Mean: Months unemployed 0.004∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗ (0.002) 0.004 (0.003)
σ 1.029 (0.093) 0.924 (0.122) 1.161 (0.146)
ρ 0.514 (0.045) 0.461 (0.065) 0.574 (0.062)
Log Lik. -4064.0 -2067.4 -1979.3
Obs. Indiv. 5827 2914 2913
Obs. Total 11654 5828 5826
Note: Random-effects probit estimation; Average partial effects; Standard errors in parentheses; Previous
period indicated by (t− 5); Initial condition indicated by (t = 1); ρ: estimate of the cross-period correlation of
the composite error term ai + εit; Significant at 1% ∗∗∗, significant at 5% ∗∗, significant at 10% ∗.
the vertical dimension indicating whether the educational level exceeds the job requirements,
this section focuses on mismatches in the educational field. Educational mismatches in the
horizontal dimension may occur if graduates acquired field-specific skills and knowledge that do
not match the occupational skills required for their jobs. Therefore, their stock of human capital
may not be fully utilised and investments into field-specific skills do not pay off. Educational
mismatches do frequently occur in both dimensions simultaneously, e.g. because few vacancies
are available within a field and graduates have to downgrade to find a job. However, they
represent distinct forms of educational mismatch. Individual motives and preferences may be
very different for field of study mismatches than for overqualification. For instance, individuals
may choose higher-paying or more career-oriented occupations outside the own field voluntarily.
Similarly to Robst (2007), I employ a subjective measure for horizontal mismatch. A dummy
variable is constructed taking the value 1 if graduates indicated that their current job matches
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their field of study only to a low extent.25 In each of the three waves, roughly 16% of the
graduates are horizontally mismatched (Table A.5). Conditional on the previous matching
status, the probability to hold a job that is barely related to the own field amounts to 45%
(9%) for graduates who haven been previously mismatched (well-matched) in the horizontal
dimension. Therefore, the raw state dependence of 36 percentage points is high but somewhat
lower than the raw state dependence of overqualification. Table 6 provides the results of the
Wooldridge estimator concerning the true state dependence of horizontal mismatch. For all
graduates, the average partial effect of lagged horizontal mismatch is positive and significant
indicating a true state dependence effect amounting to 4 percentage points. This result is
very similar to the estimated true state dependence for overqualification. Gender differences
concerning true state dependence are likewise small (specification 2 and 3). In line with the
results for overqualification, the effect of the mismatch status in the initial period is much larger
than the effect of the previous period indicating that selection into an early mismatch based on
unobserved factors is highly important for the persistence.
Concerning observed heterogeneity, the results show that graduates with better grades and
lower study duration are more likely to hold a job that is related to the own field of study.
Signalling a high level of occupational skills by better university grades may help graduates to
find suitable jobs within their field of study. This result is also in line with the previous finding
that more able graduates are less likely to be overqualified.
7 Conclusion
In this study, I have analysed the dynamic features of overqualification over the early career
cycle of tertiary graduates in Germany. The empirical analysis is based on panel data for two
cohorts of graduates who participated in interviews conducted 1, 5, and 10 years after graduation.
Overqualification is found to be highly persistent and to represent a permanent phenomenon for
a substantial share of graduates. The probability to be overqualified is found to be 45 percentage
points higher for those graduates who have already been overqualified approximately 5 years
before. Accounting for a rich set of explanatory variables reduces the dynamic effect of previous
overqualification experience to 34 percentage points. Therefore, raw state dependence partly
arises due to observed heterogeneity affecting the probability to be overqualified at each point
in time. Heterogeneity concerning study characteristics and individual ability, as measured by
university and school grades, seems to be particularly relevant. Graduates with better university
grades are less likely to enter or to be trapped in overqualification.
25In each wave, graduates had to indicate on a 5-point Likert-scale to what extent their current job matches
their education in terms of field of study. I construct a binary indicator for horizontal mismatch taking the
value 1 for all respondents opting for the Likert-values 2 and 1 (1 being titled “not at all”).
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In order to analyse to what extent state dependence arises due to a behavioural effect or due
to spurious correlation induced by unobserved factors, I employ the dynamic random-effects
estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005). Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the
initial conditions problem, the results suggest that a moderate share of the overqualification
persistence can be attributed to true state dependence. Previous overqualification experience is
found to have a significant but small behavioural effect on future overqualification amounting to
3 percentage points. In conjunction with the finding that observed heterogeneity explains only
a fraction of the persistence, these results suggest that unobserved factors are the main driver
of the high persistence of overqualification. In particular, unobserved characteristics driving
the selection into the initial state of overqualification are strongly related to the probability to
remain overqualified later on. Such forms of unobserved heterogeneity might include preferences
for particular job characteristics that can be found in low-requirement jobs, e.g. lower workload.
Moreover, differences in ability that are not captured by grades may induce persistence because
graduates with low ability lack the skills required to switch to an adequate job. Overall, I find
little evidence for gender-specific differences in the dynamics of overqualification. Finally, the
results are shown to be robust to the choice of the econometric model and the measure for
educational mismatch.
Limitations of the current study may arise from the fact that only three observations per
respondent are available in the data. In addition, the study does not account for a potential
systematic attrition of respondents which may induce a selection of more able graduates into the
estimation sample. Furthermore, the measurement of overqualification is subjective and relies
on the respondents’ valuation of skill requirements which is assumed to be constant over time.
The following policy implications can be drawn from this analysis. Since true state de-
pendence explains only a small share of the overqualification persistence, policies that help
avoiding or exiting overqualification are unlikely to exhibit long-lasting effects on the rate of
overqualification. Policies rather need to permanently reduce barriers that prevent graduates
from finding appropriate jobs matching their level of qualification. Since overqualification
persistence is only partly explained by the rich set of observable characteristics included in the
empirical analysis, further research is needed in order to disentangle which further barriers could
contribute to the overqualification persistence.
The study shows that the field of study is an important determinant of overqualification
over the first ten years of the career cycle. Therefore, a further implication is that the need for
policy measures to reduce allocation constraints might differ across fields of study. By far the
lowest incidence of overqualification is found for graduates in Medicine, Law, and Teaching who
have to take a state examination which is a prerequisite for holding a civil service job or a job
regulated by the state. These graduates will act on a highly specialised labour market narrowly
focused on their own profession. The demand for graduates seems to be sufficiently high in
these fields so that constrained options do not result in a high risk of overqualification. In
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contrast, allocation processes might be more difficult in the other fields leading to a higher share
of mismatched graduates. A comparably low rate of overqualification among STEM graduates
could be explained by the high demand for their field-specific skills. These skills are deemed to
be highly important for innovation and technical developments as drivers of economic growth.
In the light of the public debate about a potential shortage of STEM graduates, targeted
measures could help to reconcile the actual available supply and the high demand for STEM
graduates. The higher incidence of overqualification in Business Administration, Economics,
Social and Cultural Sciences raises the question whether the demand for tertiary graduates in
these fields is sufficiently high in order to absorb the increasing supply. Even after 10 years of
labour market experience, more than one fifth of the graduates in these fields have not found
a formally adequate job. Whether policies should focus on supporting a better match after
course completion or should try to attract more applicants to other fields of study with lower
rates of overqualification requires further research. In particular, policies aiming to attract more
applicants for, e.g., STEM subjects have to be based on studies which account for potential
self-selection into fields of study.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Patterns of Overqualification
Patterns of Overqualification All Matched Overqualified
0: Matched; 1: Overqualified graduates in t = 1 in t = 1
t = 1 t = 5 t = 10 Percent Percent Percent
0 0 0 71.5 86.0
0 1 0 4.5 5.5
0 0 1 3.7 4.4
0 1 1 3.5 4.2
1 0 0 6.9 41.0
1 1 0 2.8 16.9
1 0 1 1.5 8.9
1 1 1 5.6 33.2
100 100 100
Note: Number of observations is 5,987; t depicts the time of observation 1, 5,
and 10 years after graduation; Source: HIS-Graduate Panel 1997, 2001
Table A.2: Transition Matrices
From t = 1 to t = 5: Status in t = 5
Matched Overqualified Total
Status in t = 1
Matched 90.4 9.7 100
Overqualified 49.9 50.1 100
Raw state dependence 40.4
From t = 5 to t = 10: Status in t = 10
Matched Overqualified Total
Status in t = 5
Matched 93.8 6.2 100
Overqualified 44.9 55.1 100
Raw state dependence 48.9
Note: Number of observations is 5,987; t depicts the time of observation 1, 5,
and 10 years after graduation; Source: HIS-Graduate Panel 1997, 2001
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Table A.3: Incidence of Overqualification by Subgroups
t = 1 t = 5 t = 10 Total
Gender:
Females 18.6 17.5 15.5 17.2
Males 14.9 15.4 12.9 14.4
Field of study:
BusAdmin/Econ 28.7 28.4 25.6 27.5
Med/Law/Teach 4.8 3.5 4.0 4.1
STEM subjects 13.1 14.5 12.2 13.3
Soc/cult sciences 30.7 27.4 22.1 26.7
University grade:
1. Quartile (Lowest Grades) 23.2 23.0 19.1 21.7
2. Quartile 18.9 19.1 16.2 18.1
3. Quartile 15.1 13.5 12.7 13.8
4. Quartile (Highest Grades) 9.8 10.1 8.7 9.5
Note: Number of observations is 5,987; t depicts the time of observation 1,
5, and 10 years after graduation; Source: HIS-Graduate Panel 1997, 2001
Table A.4: Results, Wooldridge Dynamic RE Probit, Robustness
Dependent Variable: Overqualification
(1) (2) (3)
Overqualification (t− 5) 0.029∗∗ (0.014) 0.028∗∗ (0.014) 0.032∗∗ (0.015)
Overqualification (t = 1) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.237∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.317∗∗∗ (0.030)
Female 0.019∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.013∗∗ (0.006)
University grade -0.019∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.019∗∗∗ (0.003)
School grade -0.008∗∗ (0.003) -0.009∗ (0.003)
Age at grad. < 27 -0.011 (0.007) -0.012∗ (0.007) -0.025∗∗∗ (0.006)
Parents high-skilled -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.016∗∗∗ (0.006)
Married -0.003 (0.010) -0.003 (0.010) -0.003 (0.009)
Children 0.007 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) 0.006 (0.009)
Months unemployed 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Married (t = 5) 0.003 (0.010)
Children (t = 5) 0.006 (0.009)
Months unemp (t = 5) -0.003 (0.010)
Married (t = 10) 0.000 (0.009)
Children (t = 10) 0.002 (0.002)
Months unemp (t = 10) 0.001 (0.001)
Mean: Married 0.006 (0.013) -0.004 (0.012)
Mean: Children 0.009 (0.013) 0.008 (0.012)
Mean: Months unemp 0.004∗∗ (0.002)
Study charact. Yes Yes No
σ 1.201 (0.101) 1.217 (0.101) 1.252 (0.104)
ρ 0.590 (0.041) 0.597 (0.040) 0.610 (0.040)
Log. Lik. -3827.0 -3849.4 -3983.6
Obs. Indiv. 5987 5987 5987
Obs. Total 11974 11974 11974
Note: Random-effects probit estimation; Average partial effects; Standard errors in parentheses; Previous
period indicated by (t− 5); Initial condition indicated by (t = 1); ρ: estimate of the cross-period correlation of
the composite error term ai + εit; Significant at 1% ∗∗∗, significant at 5% ∗∗, significant at 10% ∗.
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Table A.5: Summary Statistics, Additional Variables
Mean SD Min Max N
Unemployment rate (t = 1) 3.74 1.64 1.05 16.48 5987
Horizontal mismatch (t = 1) 0.16 0.37 0 1 5827
Horizontal mismatch (t = 5) 0.16 0.37 0 1 5827
Horizontal mismatch (t = 10) 0.14 0.34 0 1 5827
Source: t depicts the time of observation 1, 5, and 10 years after graduation; HIS-
Graduate Panel 1997, 2001
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